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1. INTRODUCTION
Providing competent limited representation in family matters requires
both family law experience and an understanding of the appropriate use of
limited representation. It is only then that the use of limited representation
in family matters furthers access to justice. This Article ties together the
following two components of providing access to justice in family matters:
(1) the availability of some form of legal representation, and (2)
representation by competent family law litigators. Competence is required
of all attorneys and is generally determined by the test provided in Rule 1.1
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules).' Competence
requires not only skill and knowledge but also some level of investigation
and diligence.2 It requires knowing what representation best suits the needs
of the client and a careful assessment of whether the attorney can provide
these services. And as we are reminded by the Model Rules, providing
limited representation does not extinguish the requirement to provide
competent representation. Satisfying these basic requirements is the key to
the successful use of limited representation in family matters.
Although limited representation is nothing new in other areas of the
law, the expansion of the use of limited representation involving litigation
1. See infra Part II.A.
2. See infra Part ILA.
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is a relatively new idea. Sparked by the crisis caused by increasing numbers
of pro se litigants in family courts across the nation, the American Bar
Association (ABA) responded with a change in the ethical rules to more
specifically allow the use of limited representation in matters involving
litigation. In addition, the ABA encouraged jurisdictions to adopt
procedural rules to address concerns of private attorneys considering
offering limited representation. Almost all states have adopted changes to
their procedural rules to accomplish this goal.4 Because these rules are
relatively new and practically untested in the family law area, concerns
about possible ethical rule violations or malpractice claims may deter
attorneys from providing family law litigants in need with this valuable
form of limited assistance.
It has been slightly over a decade since the ABA took the first step and
changed the Model Rules to encourage the use of limited representation in
litigation. Although many articles have been written regarding its use-
praising or criticizing its effectiveness-little empirical data has been
compiled.5 There remains little concrete evidence, if any, showing that the
use of limited representation has increased access to justice in our family
courts-one of the courts most in need of assistance with pro se litigants.
While this information would provide a valuable resource for assessing the
effectiveness of offering limited representation as well as an examination of
how scarce resources can best be allocated, this lack of data should not
preclude an analysis based on what is already known about effective legal
representation and client needs.
First, this Article will discuss the competency requirements found both
in the ethical rules and in the traditional expectations of the family law
attorney. Next, this Article will define the phrase "limited representation"
and will track its use as a means of providing access to justice in family
courts. This will include a discussion of the ABA's role in encouraging
changes and the jurisdictional response. After analyzing competency
requirements and the rules regarding limited representation, this Article will
demonstrate that i is only when attorneys possess experience in family law
matters and understand the need to stay within the rules governing limited
representation that increased access to justice can be accomplished. Here,
3. See infra Part III.B.
4. D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized
Study in Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 904-
05 (2013),
S. Id. at 905-06 (citing D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized
Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use)
Make?, 121 YALE LJ. 2118, 2124-25 (2012) (suggesting that one reason for the marginal effect
representation has had is that pro se litigants have greater access to the issues)).
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both the complex nature of family law and the lessons learned from the use
of limited representation in civil cases other than family matters will be
examined. Finally, this Article will give suggestions for increasing the
number of experienced family law attorneys who can provide competent
limited representation to further the goal of increasing access to justice in
family matters.
II. COMPETENCE AND THE FAMILY LAW ATTORNEY
Providing competent representation in family matters starts with
adhering to the basic competency rule.6 The competency rule, however,
also requires compliance with other ethical and procedural rules and a
familiarity with the specialized area of domestic-relations law. In addition,
because domestic-relations matters often present intense emotional and
complex financial problems, domestic-relations attorneys must have strong
client management skills and be able to identify issues outside the
traditional family law realm.7 In the past, family law matters were typically
in the hands of a "generalist."8 Today, however, family law attorneys are
expected to be specialists.9
A. Model Rule 1.1
Model Rule 1.1 provides the standard for all attorneys: "A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.'o This is not a random
assignment of a rule number. The Model Rules start with the competency
rule because it provides the umbrella under which all other ethical rules can
6. Model Rule 1.1 governs all forms of representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1,1 (2013).
7. See Barbara Glesner Fines & Cathy Madsen, Caring Too Little, Caring Too Much;
Competence and the Family Law Attorney, 75 U. MiSS.-KAN. CITY L. REv. 965, 968 (2007)
(noting that the role of the family law attorney requires an understanding of complex legal issues
in areas of bankruptcy, tort liability, taxation, and other areas of the law); see also Clare Dalton et
al., High Conflict Divorce, Violence, and Abuse: Implications for Custody and Visitations
Decisions, 54 JUv. & FAM. CT. J. 11, 11-12 (2003) (discussing the judges within a family-law
matter when the underlying relationships are abusive or feature high-intensity conflict).
8. Andrew S. Grossman, Avoiding Legal Malpractice in Family Law Cases: The Dangers
ofNot Engaging in Financial Discovery, 33 FAM. L.Q. 361, 370 (1999).
9. Id at 368-70 ("[A~n attorney who holds himself out as a specialist will be deemed a
specialist, regardless of whether he actually possesses superior skill, knowledge, experience, or
expertise .... ).
10. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2013).
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be understood." The term "skill," when used to determine competency, is
defined as a "special form of competence which is not part of the ordinary
equipment of the reasonable man, but which is the result of acquired
learning, and aptitude developed by special training and experience."12
Determining whether an attorney has the required knowledge and skill to
handle a particular matter includes an examination of the "complexity and
specialized nature" of the case and the lawyer's "general experience" in the
area of the law involved.13 A lawyer is expected to recognize when, even
with "preparation and study," the client's interest will be better served by
not taking the case and by referring the client to an attorney with
"competence in the field in question."1 4 When determining issues within a
case, an attorney must be competent to handle an "inquiry into and analysis
of the factual and legal elements of the problem."" Thus, the competency
requirement begins during the initial intake and continues until the
representation is complete.'6
B. Knowledge and Skill Necessary for Competent Representation i
Family Matters
Over the past fifty years, the changing nature of family law, and the
practice of law in general, increased the skills and knowledge a practitioner
must have to be considered a competent family law attorney.'7 The family
law practice today is "more complex, more specialized, more
interdisciplinary, and more expensive, with greater risks for sanction and
liability."'" Today's family law practice, however, also provides a "greater
opportunit[y] for financial reward" because of the increasing need for
assistance with these sensitive and complex matters.19 What was once a
11. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 89 (2012-2013 ed. 2012) ("It is no accident that
the first Model Rule requires competence, for the drafters of the Model Rules believed that the
first rule of legal ethics is competence.").
12, Grossman, supra note 8, at 364.
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 1 (2013).
14. See id.
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt 5 (2013).
16. See Michele N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The Efficacy
of Using Unbundled Legal Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving Litigation, 2 ST.
MARY'S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 166, 220 (2012) ("The timing of the inquiry is
complicated by this determination, which usually occurs, and should occur, during the initial
intake.").
17. See Barbara Glesner Fines, Fifty Years of Family Law Practice-The Evolving Role of
the Family Law Attorney, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 391, 405 (2012).
18. Id. at 391-92.
19. Id.
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term that focused on the relationship between a husband and wife, the term
"family" is defined very differently today.20 Changes in social attitudes,
economically driven changes in gender roles, and scientific advancement
have led to great diversity in family formation.2' As a result, the family law
practice, which once focused primarily on the dissolution of marriage, now
typically includes representing separating unmarried partners, grandparents,
and other extended family members.
The issues involved in family law matters also became more
specialized and more complex. Even though the emergence of "no fault"
divorce simplified the traditional divorce action, child custody and financial
issues have expanded in number and complexity.23 Today, child custody
issues are often determined by social science concepts,24 and joint custody
presumptions present logistically and emotionally complicated co-parenting
issues.5 The economic issues involved in family matters today no longer
include only a determination of support26 or the division of the marital
home as the primary family asset. Rather, a divorce or separation today
often requires the division of intangible personal property, such as
"complex financial investments" and pensions.27 What constitutes property
is now defined broadly by family courts, with some jurisdictions including
"goodwill" associated with a business and even a professional degree in the
definition.2 To adequately advise clients, family law attorneys must have
knowledge of many other areas of state and federal law,29 such as estate
20. See id. at 392-94; see also Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and
Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381,
384 (2008) ("Dynamic changes ... occurred in the composition of the American family as the
number of divorces grew, unwed fathers won parental rights, and more couples, heterosexual and
same sex, chose to live together and have children without getting married.").
21. Fines, supra note 17, at 393-95. ("[M]edical science is developing assisted
reproductive technologies faster than the laws can keep pace.").
22. Id. at 404 ('[T]oday a family law attorney may be called on to resolve disputes over
ownership of property between unmarried couples, represent a grandparent in a guardianship for
her grandchild, or bring an action to determine parentage.").
23. Id at 397-98.
24. Id at 398.
25. See id. at 399,
26. Because the division of property was traditionally determined by property law, and
most property was held in the husband's name, property distribution would typically require little
analysis. The only remaining financial issue was support. Id,
27. Id. at 399-400.
28. J. Thomas Oldham, Changes in the Economic Consequences of Divorces, 1958-2008,
42 FAM. L.Q. 419, 430 (2008).
29. See Elrod & Dale, supra note 20, at 382-83. While it was once an area of law governed
almost exclusively by state and local law, family law matters now often include issues involving
federal statutory and constitutional law, and often involve national and international issues. Id.
164 [ Vol. 56:159
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planning, bankruptcy, and tax law.39 Because of the increasing complexity
of parenting and financial issues, family law attorneys must often rely on
social science or financial experts.3'
Further complicating today's family law practice is that these sensitive
family issues are decided by judges who enjoy great statutory discretion and
whose decisions are given great deference As a result, every case is truly
different: case law on the same issue can vary greatly, making it more
difficult to predict outcomes.33 On a more local level, the outcome of a
similar issue can vary from judge to judge within the same courthouse and
even with the same judge on a different day.34 Strong client management
skills are necessary to properly educate and advise clients regarding the
unpredictability of, and resulting increased cost associated with, litigating
family matters.35 Litigants who cannot afford to hire a skilled family law
practitioner will likely become another pro se litigant in an already stressed
family court system.
Because of the sensitive financial and highly emotional issues often
involved in domestic-relations matters, attorneys are often faced with
ethical dilemmas. A skilled domestic-relations attorney can identify red
flags and deal with them early on.37 Attorneys cannot ethically assist clients
in making misrepresentations or committing fraud.38 An attorney also
cannot "fail to disclose a material fact" if to do so would be assisting the
client in committing fraud. Clients, for example, may raise
unsubstantiated accusations about he other side, or they may seek to
withhold financial information.40 A client's desire to not do anything at all
can also raise ethical issues for family law attorneys, and attorneys must be
30. See Fines & Madsen, supra note 7, at 968; see also Fines, supra note 17, at 400.
31. See Fines, supra note 17, at 398-400.
32. Struffolino, supra note 16, at 177; see also Fines & Madsen, supra note 7, at 967. "A
discretionary standard of review is allowed in family law cases due to the intermingling of
psychology and the law within domestic-relations matters." Struffolino, supra note 16, at 177
n.26; see also People ex rel. E.C., 47 P.3d 707, 709 (Colo. App. 2002) (stating that in a post-
termination of parental rights proceeding, a trial court's findings and conclusions will not be
disturbed on review if the record supports them).
33. Struffolino, supra note 16, at 177.
34. See id. at 177 n.26 (citing Fines & Madsen, supra note 7, at 967).
35. See id. at 177-78.
36. See Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 378-384 (2005)
(suggesting that not having legal representation is generally perceived negatively and results in
inefficiency).
37. Dignity Health v. Seare (In re Seare), 493 BR. 158, 189 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2013).
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2013).
39. Alan C. Eidsness & Lisa T. Spencer, Confronting Ethical Issues in Practice: The Trial
Lawyer's Dilemma, 45 FAM. L.Q. 21, 22 (2011) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
4.1(b) (2003)).
40. See, e.g., id. at 22-23.
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careful not to assist a client in delaying proceedings or assist the client in
efforts to keep the other side from obtaining a justified outcome.41 Once
these ethical dilemmas are identified, strong client management skills are
necessary to explain to the client that he or she is pursuing a dangerous
course of action, and the attorney must also convince the client that full
disclosure is in the client's best interest)2 The attorney must also be able to
identify when, despite best efforts, the client is unlikely to follow counsel's
advice, and the attorney must seek to end the representation.3 If litigation
has begun, this is often no easy task.
The difficulties and dilemmas associated with a domestic-relations
practice do not disappear, nor should they be less of a concern, when
offering only limited representation. In fact, it is because of the complex
and highly emotional nature of family law matters that limited
representation requires the services of a competent and experienced family
law litigator.
III. AN OLD DOG AND A NEW TRICK: LIMITED REPRESENTATION AS A
TOOL TO INCREASE ACCESS TO JUSTICE
The basic idea behind limited representation is that some legal
representation is better than none.4 Offering litigants who could not
otherwise afford full representation the opportunity to hire an attorney for
only some of the tasks or issues is better than proceeding pro se for the
entire case.46 This alternative is especially attractive to litigants of low- and
moderate-income, attorneys facing dwindling numbers of paying clients,
and family courts faced with an influx of unrepresented litigants slowing
41. See id. at 28 (discussing possible ethical violations for an attorney who complies with a
client's request to delay proceedings while the client is receiving temporary spousal support which
is set to terminate after entry of the judgment or decree).
42. Seeid.at23.
43. Id. at 25 ("[A] lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the
client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law." (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1,16 cmt. 2
(2003))).
44. See id. at 23-27.
45. Hon. Judith L. Kreeger, To Bundle or Unbundle? That Is the Question, 40 FAM. CT.
REv. 87, 89 (2002).
46. See Molly M. Jennings & D. James Greiner, The Evolution of Unbundling in Litigation
Matters: Three Case Studies and a Literature Review, 89 DENV. U. L. REv. 825, 831-32 (2012);
see also Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can
Provide an Ethically Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Litigants, 20 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 563, 566 (2007) C[Limited scope representation provides promise for increasing
access to justice for low-income Americans . ... ).
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down the wheels of justice.4 7 With the ABA taking the lead, a long-used
alternative to full representation in matters not involving litigation was
expanded to meet the needs of those involved in, or about to be involved in,
litigation.
A. Limited Scope Representation
Limited representation is also known as "unbundled legal services" or
"discrete task representation , Unlike traditional full-service
representation, where the attorney is responsible for utilizing all means to
obtain the client's stated goal, the attorney's responsibilities are limited to
those chosen by the client.49 Therefore, the bundle of tasks typically
associated with full representation is "unbundl[ed."o For example, rather
than hiring an attorney in a divorce action with the ultimate goal of securing
a judgment that resolves all issues, the client may hire the attorney to obtain
only one objective, such as child support.5 The client may also hire the
attorney to perform only one task, such as drafting the divorce petition.52 At
the heart of limited representation is the agreement between the client and
the attorney." It is through this agreement that the client can maintain
control over the attorney's responsibilities, thus enabling the client to
control the cost of representation.54 The ability to control the cost of the
representation is often cited as the most valuable attribute associated with
limited representation. 5
47. See Struffolino, supra note 16, at 205-06 (arguing that pro se litigants present
challenges to court clerks and judges by expecting substantial assistance with--or leniency when
applying-procedural requirements).
48. Forrest S. Mosten, Collaborative Law Practice: An Unbundled Approach to Informed
Client Decision Making, 2008 J. DisP. RESOL. 163, 163 (2008).
49. Id at 165.
50. Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling ofLegal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 FAM. L.Q.
421,423 (1994).
51. This is known as horizontal unbundling. Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling Legal Services
Today-And Predictions for the Future, 35 FAM, ADVOC. 14, 15 (2012).
52. This is known as vertical unbundling. Id at 14.
53. See Mosten, supra note 50, at 423-26.
54. See id. at 425; see also Kasey W, Kincaid & Kimberly J. Walker, Managing Litigation
Costs: The Client Cannot Start Too Soon, 41 DRAKE L. REv. 67, 68 (1992) (focusing on the
client's point of view regarding the managing of legal expenses for litigation, beginning as early
as the selection process).
55. See MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE, A.B.A. 3-4 (2003), (inferring that clients may wish to limit representation because
they think that services are too costly).
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Limited representation is not a new concept in matters not involving
litigation.6 It could provide the means to final settlement of family matters
through mediation or collaboration.5 7 Domestic-relations attorneys routinely
limit the scope of their services to review a mediated divorce agreement
without being obliged to advocate for a better resolution or to do further
investigation.58 Even before the movement to encourage private attorneys to
offer limited representation in matters involving litigation, legal aid
attorneys were taking advantage of this option to provide some legal
services to those in need.59 The private bar, however, was reluctant to
follow. 60 Because of complex procedural and evidentiary rules associated
with litigation, limited representation in matters involving ongoing court
involvement was typically viewed as not being an option by private
attorneys.6' It was not until family courts across the country began to feel
the effects of the pro se phenomenon62 that limited representation was seen
as an option in contested omestic-relations matters.
B. The Pro Se Phenomenon Triggers EJfrts to Expand the Use of
Limited Representation as a Mechanism to Increase Access to Justice
Although it was common for litigants to proceed pro se in state trial
courts, until two decades ago, litigants in family law matters were typically
represented." Today, the opposite is true in family court, where "pro se is
56. Id, at 5. Tasks or objectives associated with one corporate matter are commonly divided
between in-house counsel and private counsel. See id, at 5-6 ("The corporate client may reduce
the overall legal costs by having in-house counsel oversee a project and perform many of the
tasks, while retaining outside specialists, such as tax, real estate, or corporate finance lawyers, to
provide specific advice on specific questions.").
57. Mosten, supra note 51, at 15-16.
58. See, e.g., Lerner v. Laufer, 819 A.2d 471, 482-83 (N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
59. Jennings & Greiner, supra note 46, at 826.
60. Id. at 827.
61. Struffolino, supra note 16, at 190-91; see also Rochelle Klempner, Unbundled Legal
Services in New York State Litigated Matters: A Proposal to Test the Eficacy Through Law
School Clinics, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 653, 654 (2006) (espousing that limited scope
representation has not been widely used in litigation); Raymond P. Micklewright, Discrete Task
Representation a/k/a Unbundled Legal Services, 29 COLO. LAw. 5, 6 (2000) ("[I]n litigation
matters, lawyers historically have provided full [-]service representation because of the complexity
of the procedural rules, as well as the rules of evidence, at trial."),
62. See Struffolino, supra note 16, at 195 (citing Swank, supra note 36, at 374 (defining the
rise in pro se litigants as the "the pro se phenomenon")).
63. Id.
64. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., AN ANALYSIS OF
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no longer a matter of growth, but rather a status at a saturated level." The
percentage of pro se litigants in family matters has been reported to be as
high as ninety percent.6 While financial reasons are often cited as the cause
of this increase, other emotional and societal factors contributed as well.
The availability of no-fault divorce in the 1970s sparked an increase in
divorce rates.68 Shortly after that, an increase in self-help resources and the
rising cost of legal representation made self-representation. a viable
choice.9 With the average cost of legal representation being over $295 per
hour and the average cost of a divorce being $20,000 and as high as
$150,000 for a contested case involving trial,70 it was not just the "poor"
who could no longer afford an attorney.7' Middle-class individuals also
could no longer afford to pay for legal representation, especially in matters
65. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing John M. Greacen, Self Represented Litigants and Court
and Legal Services Responses to Their Needs: What We Know, CAL. CTS, 7,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/SRLwhatwcknow.pdf (last visited July 4, 2014)).
66. Swank, supra note 36, at 376 (finding that even those who hire an attorney often face
an unrepresented opponent).
67. Struffolino, supra note 16, at 195 (citing Nina Ingwer VanWormer, Note, Help at Your
Fingertips: A Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro Se Phenomenon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983,
1016 n.188 (2007) ("[T]he increase in pro se litigation can be attributed to a variety of financial,
societal, and psychological factors.")); see also Howard M. Rubin, The Civil Pro Se Litigant v. the
Legal System, 20 Loy. U. CHI, L.J. 999, 999 (1989) (highlighting that because of a lack of legal
aid in rural areas, residents of these areas may have no choice but to litigate alone); Swank, supra
note 36, at 378-79 (listing a variety of reasons as to why people proceed pro se, such as "an anti-
lawyer sentiment," noneconomic reasons, and "a mistrust of the legal system").
68. Struffolino, supra note 16, at 198-99; Judith G. McMullen & Debra Oswald, Why Do
We Need a Lawyer?: An Empirical Study of Divorce Cases, 12 JL. & FAM. STUD. 57, 62-63
(2010); see also Ray D. Madoff, Lurking in the Shadow: The Unseen Hand of Doctrine in Dispute
Resolution, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 161, 166 (2002) (arguing that the passage of no-fault divorce laws
has caused more divorce and more instances of mediation). But see Lisa Milot, Note, Restitching
the American Marital Quilt: Untangling Marriage from the Nuclear Family, 87 VA. L. REv. 701,
706 (2001) ("One text reports succinctly that divorce rates 'dramatically accelerated upward' in
the 1960s and 1970s while most of the shift to no-fault divorce laws occurred in the early 1970s
and t980s, 'after the largest increases in divorce rates had already occurred."' (quoting IRA MARK
ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 221 (3d ed. 1998))).
69. See Mosten, supra note 50, at 423 (discussing the divorce litigant's use of self-help in
the divorce process); Leslie Feitz, Comment, Pro Se Litigants in Domestic Relations Cases, 21 J.
AM. ACAD, MATRIMONIAL LAW. 193, 195 (2008) (discussing the use of online forms to aid pro se
divorce litigants in the legal process),
70. Struffolino, supra note 16, at 200; see also Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge
of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 439, 443 (2009) (pointing to high legal fees as a
reason for litigants to proceed pro se); Drew A. Swank, in Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need
to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L,
REV. 1537, 1541 (2005) ("[A]n uncontested divorce that does not go to court will cost around
$16,500, whereas a contested divorce that proceeds to trial could cost more than S150,000."
(quoting Amy C. Henderson, Comment, Meaningful Access to the Courts?: Assessing Self-
Represented Litigants' Ability to Obtain a Fair, Inexpensive Divorce in Missouri 's Court System,
72 U. Miss.-KAN. CITY L. REv. 571, 573 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
71. Struffolino, supra note 16, at 199-200.
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involving ongoing litigation. 7' Those who typically would qualify for some
form of free legal assistance were hit with the effects of a drastic reduction
in funding for legal aid services and a shortage of attorneys willing to offer
pro bono assistance.
In the wake of the financial crisis over the past decade, matters
involving litigation have increased; on the top of the list of cases that
increased in number are domestic-relations cases.74 The number of pro se
litigants also increased. The increase in pro se litigants and the decrease in
available free legal services threatened to cripple an already stressed legal
system.76 Pro se litigants who showed up in family courts expected
substantial assistance from judges, clerks, and other court personnel.77 Most
importantly, the lack of representation had a negative impact on case
outcomes. A 2010 ABA survey reported that 62% of the responding judges
reported that outcomes were worse for pro se litigants.78 With the ABA
taking the lead, states responded with changes to both ethical and
procedural rules. The changes were meant to encourage private attorneys to
offer limited representation by alleviating some of the concerns and
addressing some of the misconceptions associated with the limited
representation.
1. The ABA Response
The ABA effort to encourage and expand the use of limited scope
representation in litigation came in a two-pronged approach. First, the 2000
Ethics Commission recommended a change to Model Rule 1.2(c) "to more
clearly permit, but also more specifically regulate" limited scope
72. Id. at 200 (citing Sande L. Buhai, Access to Unrepresented Litigants: A Comparative
Perspective, 42 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 979, 979 (2009)); see also John L. Kane, Jr., Debunking
Unbundling, 29 COLO. LAW, 15, 15 (2000) ("[L]awyers continue to increase the gap between cost
and value of services. Not only have the poor been left behind... they are being joined in
alarming numbers by .. the middle class."),
73. Struffolino, supra note 16, at 201-02.
74. Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship-A Legal Crisis
and Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45, 45 (2011) (reporting that 49% of the responding judges in a
2010 ABA nationwide survey of state trial judges on the topic of pro se litigation mentioned an
increase in domestic-relations cases).
75. Id. at 46 (reporting that 60% of the responding judges in a 2010 ABA nationwide
survey of state trial judges on the topic of pro se litigation stated that fewer litigants were being
represented by counsel).
76. See Struffolino, supra note 16, at 198-208.
77. Landsman, supra note 70, at 451 (citing JONA GOLDSCHMmT ET AL., MEETING THE
CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT
MANAGERS 53 (1998)).
78. Painter, supra note 74, at 46-
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representation." This change was adopted in 2002.8o Not long after that, an
ABA task force issued the Handbook on Limited Scope Legal Assistance as
a "practical guide," providing advice to attorneys on how to incorporate the
use of limited representation into their practice.8' These two initial steps-
meant to encourage the use of limited scope representation-were presented
as a way to improve outcomes for low- and moderate-income individuals
who, because they could not afford full representation, were forced to
navigate the court system unrepresented.82 For the task force, it was an
issue of fairness: "The process often is not fair for those who cannot afford
to pay lawyers to represent them in litigation. They include most low[-] and
moderate-income families and individuals; that is, the majority of the
people in our nation!"8 3
a. Model Rule 1.2(c)
Compliance with the ethical rule allowing the use of limited
representation in litigation is best accomplished with the involvement of an
experienced family law attorney. When the Ethics Commission's
recommendations were adopted in 2002, Model Rule 1.2(c) was amended
to read: "A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation
is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed
consent."84 Prior to this change, the rule stated that "[a] lawyer may limit
the objective of the representation if the client consents after
consultation."85 By replacing the word objective with the word scope, the
Model Rules expanded the use of limited representation to allow not only
the ability to limit the goals of the representation but also to permit limiting
79. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 64, at 8
(emphasis omitted).
80. See supra Part II.B.
81. See MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 55, at 1.
82. ETHICs 2000 COMM'N, A.B.A. MODEL RULE 1.2: REPORTER'S EXPLANATION OF
CHANGES, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/policy/ethics_2000co
mmission/c2k.rulel2remhtmi (last visited July 4, 2014); see also A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON
THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERvS., supra note 64, at 3; MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note
55, at 1; Struffolino, supra note 16, at 215.
83. MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 55, at 3.
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2013) (emphasis added).
85. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 64, at 8
(emphasis added) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (1998)). The
"objectives" of the representation are to be determined by the client, while the means of
accomplishing the objectives are to be carried out by the attorney after consultation with the
client. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT t 1.2(a) (2013).
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the means or tasks to carry out the goal.8 This expansion is clarified in the
comments to the amended rule:
A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has
limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms
upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific
means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's
objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client
thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or
imprudent.87
In addition to expanding the definition of limited representation to
encourage its use in litigation, the changed wording of Rule 1.2(c) also
provided a means to "more specially regulate" the use of unbundling by
requiring the limitation be both reasonable under the circumstances and
based upon the client's informed consent.88 The foundation for
understanding these requirements is the competency rule.
The duty to provide competent representation is not excused when
providing limited representation; it is, however, "a factor to be considered
when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness[,] and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."89 Even when the
scope is limited, the attorney has a duty to investigate the facts and assess
the possible legal issues that may arise.90 Through communication with the
client, the attorney must not only investigate the facts as they relate to the
client's objectives but also identify any red flags, as well as other areas that
are likely beyond the client's knowledge, outside the client's current
concern, or otherwise indicate that the use of limited representation would
be inappropriate.91 Effective communication during the initial consultation
is therefore essential to assessing the appropriateness of providing limited
86. See Struffolino, supra note 16, at 215-16 (citing MODEL RULES OF FROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.2(c) (2002)).
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 6 (2013).
88. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 64, at 8;
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.2'cmt, 7 (2013) ("Although this Rule affords the lawyer
and client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under
the circumstances.").
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.2 cmt. 7 (2013).
90. Dignity Health v. Seare (In re Scare), 493 B.R. 158, 188 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2013) (citing
Struffolino, supra note 16, at 218); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Limited Performance Agreements:
Should Clients Get What They Pay For?, II GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 915, 917 (1998) ("The codes
allow lawyers and clients to limit the scope of representation by agreement, but not to the extent
of limiting 'competence' .... (footnotes omitted)).
91. In re Scare, 493 B.R. at 189 (quoting State Bar of Cal. Comm. on Prof I Responsibility
& Conduct, An Ethics Primer on Limited Scope Legal Representation, ETHICS HOTLINER 1-2
(2004), http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-_gb8teBENOs%3D&tabid 834); see
also Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 610 (Ct. App. 1993).
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representation or, as is often the case, providing an opportunity to work
with the client to redefine the client's objectives based upon a better
understanding of the legal issues and the advantages and disadvantages of
- 92limited representation as a means to attaining the objectives. For this
reason, the initial interview should be as extensive as an interview
conducted when offering full representation.9 3
It is through this inquiry that the attorney can assess whether limiting
the scope of the representation is reasonable under the circumstances,94
Experienced family law attorneys possess the skills to conduct this
assessment. Factors to consider when determining whether the limitation is
reasonable include the complexity of the issues involved, the time required
to address the issues, and whether other resources are available to assist the
client.95 Another important factor that should be assessed is the client's
ability to handle the rest of the case-that part of the case in which the
client will continue to proceed pro se-on her own.96 If the decision to
proceed with limited representation is later challenged, the reasonableness
of the limitation is governed by the circumstances that existed at the time of
the agreement, which was most likely during the initial consultation.97
Because complex legal issues and high emotion are often present in family
matters, the circumstances that exist at the time of the initial consultation
are often difficult to navigate.
A competent and experienced family law attorney is also in the best
position to satisfy the second requirement of Model Rule .2(c): obtaining
the client's informed consent.99 The need for regular attorney-client
communication was a recurring theme in the changes to the ethical rules
92. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2013); see also In re Seare, 493
B.R. at 190 ("The attorney bears the burden of failing to ascertain the client's objectives ... or
failing to shape the[se] objectives to conform to the remedies available under law."); MODEST
MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 55, at 95.
93. MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 55, at 95.
94. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(h) (2013) ("[The tern r]easonable...
[,] when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer[,] denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent
and competent lawyer.").
95, Struffolino, supra note 16, at 221 (citing Farley, supra note 46, at 574); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 7 (2013); MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra
note 55, at 63 (noting that "the importance of the interests at stake [and] the complexity of the
matter" are, among other things, some considerations that should be taken into account when
determining whether limited assistance is appropriate).
96. Struffolino, supra note 16, at 222 (citing MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 55,
at 59) (explaining the basic characteristics a successful pro se litigant possesses, such as the
absence of mental disorders and the ability to fill out basic court forms).
97. Id. at 225.
98. See supra Part I.
99. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2013).
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recommended by the Ethics 2000 Commission.00 In furtherance of this
goal-and as recommended by the Commission'0 -the phrase "informed
consent" in Model Rule 1.0 is defined as an "agreement by a person to a
proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate
information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably
available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct."0 2 There are three
steps to obtaining informed consent to support a limited representation
agreement: (1) the attorney must obtain sufficient information from the
client to determine the client's goals and assess whether offering limited
scope representation can further those goals; (2) information regarding the
benefits and risks of limited representation must be communicated to the
client; and (3) the attorney must determine whether the consent given is
valid. "o
Identifying a clear understanding of the client's objectives is essential
to obtaining informed consent'04 Eliciting information from the client
during the initial interview to gain a clear understanding of the client's
needs and desires is often difficult, even for the most experienced
interviewer.10 5 Clients seeking legal assistance in family matters are often
stressed and may either not understand, or not be able to articulate, their
legal issues and goals.'06 Once the client's objectives are identified, the
client must be provided with adequate information on which to base an
informed decision concerning whether to limit the scope of
representation.I'7 Most importantly, a discussion about whether the scope of
100. COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, A.B.A., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON AMENDMENTS TO THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, 3 (2001), available at http://www.americanbar.orgcontent/dam/abaladministrative/pro
fessional responsibility/report-hod_08200 .authcheckdam.pdf.
101. Id.
102. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 10(e) (2013)
103. See Struffolino, supra note 16, at 225, 227-28.
104. See Dignity Health v. Seare (In re Seare), 493 B.R. 158, 220 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2013).
105. Struffolino, supra note 16, at 229 (citing Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client
Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 79 (1979));
see also M. SUE TALIA, A CLIENT'S GUIDE TO LIMITED LEGAL SERVICES: A SIMPLE AND
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR FAMILY LAW LITIGANTS 38 (1997) (noting that clear and thorough
communication during the initial interview, although difficult, will save numerous ambiguities
regarding each parties' legal responsibilities); Buhai, supra note 72, at 989 (recognizing that
clients may believe they have a simple issue easily handled by unbundled legal services, only later
to discover the complexity and need for further assistance),
106. Spiegel, supra note 105, at 109.
10 Struffolino, supra note 16, at 230 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.0
cmt. 6 (2002)); see also id. at n.283 ("Even reciting back the facts and explaining the
circumstances learned by the attorney from the client may be necessary because, although the
attorney has no obligation to inform the client of facts or circumstances already known to the
client, [the attorney] .. . 'assumes the risk that the client ... is inadequately informed."'); Colo.
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the representation sought will achieve, or at least advance, the client's
overall objective should occur.'08 The client should also be informed of
other alternatives available for attaining the goals. For example, the benefits
and costs of full representation, as opposed to limited representation, should
be explained to the client.109 Another alternative that should be disclosed is
the existence of any pro bono or free legal services programs available to
assist the client. t ( The adequate disclosure of information also includes an
obligation to advise the client of any other "foreseeable collateral problems"
that are related to, or that may arise out of, the issues presented."' This
includes informing the client of existing legal rights that arise out of the
facts obtained from the client.1 2
A valid consent is one that is voluntarily given."3 Consent is voluntary
when it is based on this information-sharing process and an indication that
Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 101 (1998) C'[C]onsult or consultation denotes
communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the
significance of the matter in question."), http://www.cobar.org/static/comms/ethicsifo/fo101htn
(last visited Dec. 17, 2013); L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass'n Prof'l Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Formal
Op. 502 (1999), http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfn?pageid=431 ("The attorney has a duty to
alert the client to legal problems which are reasonably apparent, even though they fall outside the
scope of retention,").
108, See In re Scare, 493 B.R. at 220; see also infra Part IV.B.2.
109. Struffolino, supra note 16, at 230-31; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.0 cmt. 6 (2002) ("Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the
facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation... fand] the material advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's
options and alternatives.").
I10, Limited representation should not be offered if other services are available to the client
for no cost. See Struffolino, supra note 16, at 228-30; Farley, supra note 46, at 574 (indicating
that an attorney should first assess the merits of the case and then the client's capacity for pro se
assistance before choosing to unbundle services).
111. In re Scare, 493 B.R. at 200; Struffolino, supra note 16, at 232 (citing Report of the
Special Committee on Limited Scope Representation, Mo. SUP. CT. & Mo. B. AsS'N 3 (2007),
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=5847); accord L.A. Cnty Bar Ass'n Prof1 Responsibility
& Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 502 ("The attorney has a duty to ... inform the client that the
limitations on the representation create the possible need to obtain additional advice, including
advice on issues collateral to the representation.").
112, See Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 608 (Ct. App. 1993). When an attorney's
retention is expressly limited, that attorney may nevertheless have "a duty to alert the client to
legal problems which are reasonably apparent" that fall outside the limited scope of
representation. Id. The Nichols court found that the attorney who signed an application for
adjudication of a workers' compensation claim had "a duty of care to advise on available
remedies, including third-party actions." Id. at 610.
113. See Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition,' Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing
Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 367, 386 (2008) ("(A]ccepting as
voluntary only the choices made by litigants aware of their options and the advantages and
disadvantages of those options.").
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the client fully understands the information provided.1 14 The challenge here
is determining whether the client fully understands all the risks and
alternative options when dealing with a family crisis, or when the client
feels that she simply has no other choice but to accept less than full
representation. 115
b. The ABA Handbook on Limited Scope Representation Encourages
Unbundling in Litigation
Changing the wording of Rule 1.2(c) was just one step toward
expanding the use of limited representation into matters involving litigation.
In addition, the ABA published a report written by the Modest Means Task
Force of the ABA Section of Litigation titled, Handbook on Limited Scope
Legal Assistance (the Handbook). "6 The Handbook was presented as a
practical guide for lawyers, judges, and those involved in the legal system
in an effort to encourage the use of limited representation as a means to
increase access to justice for those who would, because of financial
limitations, otherwise proceed pro se or not at all. 117 The Handbook focuses
on encouraging the use of limited representation in litigation, and
specifically promotes the use of such services to assist the "striking"
number of pro se litigants in domestic-relations matters.'18 The Handbook
suggests that assisting litigants in the preparation of pleadings in
uncontested domestic-relations matters that require court approval or the
actual drafting of motions or memoranda on contested issues are
appropriate ways to provide limited assistance."'9 The Handbook provides
models for offering limited representation as a means for providing both
out-of-court assistance and limited litigation assistance to those who cannot
afford full representation (or do not want it). 120 The Handbook explores the
ethical issues involved in providing limited scope representation and
follows this discussion with detailed suggestions for avoiding common
ethical traps, such as violating competency rules, failing to carefully check
for conflicts, and inappropriately communicating with the opposition.121
114. Thomas G. Wilkinson Jr., Representing Clients in Limited-Scope Engagements, PA.
LAW, Mar.-Apr. 2012 at 50, 5 1.
115. See Engler, supra note 113, at 386; see also Rachel Brill & Rochelle Sparko, Limited
Legal Services and Conflicts of Interest: Unbundling in the Public Interest, 16 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETmICS 553, 567 (2003) (stating that sometimes people have no choice other than representing
themselves because they simply cannot afford full legal services).
116. MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 55,
117. Id. at 1.
118. Id, at 8.
119. Id at 29-30.
120. Eg., id. at 33.
121. Id at 64-70.
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Even though the Handbook discusses the few jurisdictions that provide
a procedural framework for allowing limited representation, it ends with
specific recommendations on how states can expand the use of limited
representation to serve the needs of low- and moderate-income litigants. 22
These recommendations encouraged state courts to take the lead by creating
a task force to study and make recommendations on how to best use such
services to meet the growing number of pro se litigants.1'2 The task force
recognized that although the ethical rules were amended to clarify that the
use of limited representation in litigation is permitted, lawyers still may
have had reservations about how to provide such services. The Handbook,
therefore, encouraged states to review and revise their procedural rules to
reassure attorneys that the use of limited representation in litigation was
appropriate and to provide a procedural framework for providing limited
services. 124
2. Changes to Procedural Rules Address Attorney Skepticism
Even though amended Model Rule 1.2(c) was adopted in many
jurisdictions,12 5 the change did not provide a framework for providing
limited representation to clients involved in litigation. Existing court
procedural rules, which presumed that any appearance on behalf of a
litigant was full representation requiring court approval before withdrawal
from the case, did not encourage the use of limited representation.126 Even
though a limited-appearance fee agreement could be carefully negotiated to
allow the client to pay for one or a few tasks, attorneys could not count on
the scope of this agreement being recognized by the court.'27 If the
agreement with the client were not honored by the court, attorneys could
find themselves providing full representation for limited representation
fees.128 For limited representation to increase access to justice by assisting
pro se litigants involved in litigation, a procedural framework was needed
122. See id. at 140-49.
123. Id. at 140-41; see infra Part V.C.
124. MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 55, at 141.
125. A.B.A. STANDrNG COMM, ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 64, at 8.
126. Jennings & Greiner, supra note 46, at 834 ("While some organizations had well-
established relationships with judges who allowed limited scope representation and withdrawal,
mainstreaming of unbundling depended on firmer assurances." (footnote omitted)).
127. See supra Part Ill.B.
128. See Jennings & Greiner, supra note 46, at 833-34 (stating that courts interpret
unbundled service agreements differently, and it is uncertain whether courts recognize these
arrangements and allow for a lawyer's withdrawal after the performance of limited
representation).
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to address these concerns.129 As a result, many states amended or added to
their procedural rules to provide guidelines for appearing in a limited
capacity by keeping the representation limited and withdrawing once the
tasks identified in the retainer agreements were accomplished. In 2009, the
ABA's Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services issued a
publication outlining the steps that some states had already taken to amend
their rules to accommodate the use of limited representation in litigation.'
The goal of the white paper was to encourage policymakers in other
jurisdictions to amend or formulate similar rules to encourage attorneys to
offer limited scope representation to serve the needs of those who would
otherwise proceed into the court system pro se. 13
a. Limited Representation Appearance
The threshold questions to ask when assisting clients involved in, or
about to be involved in, litigation is whether providing limited
representation requires disclosure to the court and, if so, how should this
information be disclosed. Assisting pro se litigants with document
preparation is a common unbundled legal service performed by both private
attorneys and legal aid providers." When these documents or pleadings are
submitted to the court, a practice known as "ghostwriting,"' 33 the pleadings
may be subject to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure3M (or the
state counterpart), and other procedural requirements. Federal courts, for the
most part, have used Rule 11 to discourage, if not completely prohibit,
ghostwriting in federal cases.135 Rule 11 does not expressly prohibit
ghostwriting, but it presumes any party receiving legal assistance is
129. See id at 832 ("[P]roponents have suggested that unbundling constitutes a response to
the pro se litigation crisis that has afflicted the adjudicatory systems of state courts, as well as state
and federal administrative agencies, for some time."),
130. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 64, at 4,
131. See id. at 1, 4.
132. See id at 14.
133. Jessie M. Brown, Ghostwriting and the Erie Doctrine: Why Federalism Calls for
Respecting States' Ethical Treatment of Ghostwriting, 2013 J. PROF. LAW. 217, 220 (2013)
("[G]hostwriting occurs when attorneys provide limited services to persons in litigation without
appearing as full representatives.").
134. Id. at 229. Rule I1 states in pertinent part:
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one attorney
of record in the attorney's name--or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.
The paper must state the signer's address, e-mail address, and telephone number,
Unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise, a pleading need not be verified or
accompanied by an affidavit. The court must strike an unsigned paper unless the
omission is promptly corrected after being called to the attorney's or party's attention.
FED. 1R. CIV. P. 11(a).
135. Brown, supra note 133, at 229-30.
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receiving full representation.'36 An attorney providing legal assistance in
preparing documents filed in court must sign the documents and otherwise
comply with Rule 11 .137 State courts, however, have been more accepting
of the practice.138 States have balanced Rule Il 's concern for candor against
the needs of pro se litigants by developing procedural mechanisms to
provide such services.39 First, some states have distinguished between
assistance with mere document preparation and more substantial assistance,
requiring disclosure only for the latter.o4 0 Second, states that require
disclosure either protect candor requirements by simply requiring the
document or pleading state that it was prepared with the assistance of
counsel,'4 ' or by requiring the attorney to sign the document and provide
identifying and contact information.142 Both federal and state courts are
consistent, however, in requiring an appearance, limited or full, when
something more than mere document preparation is being provided.14 3
When an appearance is necessary, the procedural rules in almost all
states were amended to assist attorneys willing to provide limited assistance
to pro se litigants involved in litigation.'" While traditional appearance
procedures advance the smooth administration of matters pending before
the court, allowing a lawyer to file a limited scope representation
appearance also accomplishes this goal by minimizing the disruption to
court proceedings caused by pro se litigants. 45  As with disclosure
requirements, the methods for appearing in a limited representation capacity
136. See id. at 230.
137. Id. at 248 ("The plain meaning of Rule 11 gives two options for the signing
requirement: attorneys sign documents for represented parties and unrepresented parties sign
documents themselves. Rule 11 does not address the possibility of attorney assistance short of full
representation." (footnote omitted)).
138. Id at 231.
139. Seeid at225.
140, Tennessee allows ghostwriting but requires disclosure when there is substantial
assistance. Id. (citing Bd. of Prof I Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., Formal Op. 2007-F-
153 (2007)). Colorado permits ghostwriting for minor document preparation but requires
disclosure for anything more. Id. (citing COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2013); COLO.
R. CIV. P. 11(b)).
141. Brown, supra note 133, at 227. States find that a litigant has an unfair advantage if
attorneys "effectively represented a litigant but used the pro se status to obtain judicial leniency."
Id. at 232-33. Brown also notes that Massachusetts requires anonymous disclosure for document
preparation. Id. at 225.
142. See id. at 236.
143. See id. at 224-26.
144. See Court Rules, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/delivery jegal services/r
esources/pro_se_unbundling_resourcecenter/courtrules.htmi (last visited July 4, 2014)
(providing a list of all the states that have adopted a provision dealing with limited scope
representation).
145. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 64, at 18-
19,
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vary from state-to-state. Nevada appears to be the most lenient, allowing an
attorney to simply announce the limited representation at the beginning of
the hearing.146 Most states, however, require written notice identifying the
nature of the limitation.147 Many family courts require the use of court-
approved forms that detail the matters in which the litigant is represented.4 8
These detailed forms provide clarity regarding the tasks or issues the
attorney will handle, and they provide clarity for the court and the
opponent, or the opponent's attorney, concerning service and
communication issues.149 Although these procedures allow attorneys to
enter a matter on a limited basis, attorneys are usually more concerned with
being able to exit when the limited objectives or tasks are accomplished.
b. Staying Limited
Once a limited scope appearance has been entered, becoming involved
in matters or tasks outside those noticed in the appearance can result in the
court finding that the scope or representation is expanded to full
representation.150 Attorneys face two challenges to keeping within the scope
of the representation. The first challenge is overcoming the inherent
unpredictability of litigation, especially in family matters.51 It is nearly
impossible to predict at the outset what issues will arise while
accomplishing the tasks identified in the limited scope appearance.15
Pretrial motions are plentiful in family matters, and it is not uncommon for
seemingly uncontested issues to become the subject of an emergency
motion or an issue requiring an expedited hearing. An attorney who has
entered only a limited scope appearance must be careful not to file any
pleading or become involved in advocating for the client in any matter not
covered by the limited scope appearance.54 An attorney faced with a new
146. Id at 16 (quoting NEV. 8TH J. DiST. CT. R. 5.28) (requiring a lawyer to indicate they are
providing limited representation "in the first paragraph of the first paper or pleading filed on
behalf of the client").
147. Id. at 19 (citing N.M. Rules of Prof'1 Conduct R. 16-303(E) (2009) ("In all proceedings
where a lawyer appears for a client in a limited manner, that lawyer shall disclose to the tribunal
the scope of representation.")).
148. Id.; see also id at B-II (giving an example of a "Notice of Limited Scope
Representation" form).
149. See id. at 19.
150. E.g., id. at 20; see, e.g., N.H. R. FAM. Div. 1.19(a) ("An attorney who has filed a
limited appearance and who later files a pleading or motion outside the scope of the limited
representation shall be deemed to have amended the limited appearance to extend to such filing.").
151. See Fines & Madsen, supra note 7, at 966-67; Dalton et al., supra note 7, at 1I.
152. Limited Assistance Representation (Unbundling) Training Materials, MASS. PROB. &
FAM. CT. 3-5 (2009) (on file with the South Texas Law Review).
153. Id. at 28.
154. See, e.g., N.H. R. FAM. Div. 1.19(A).
[Vol. 56:159180
LIMITED SCOPE NOT LIMITED COMPETENCE
issue must either renegotiate the limited scope fee agreement, seek to
amend the scope of the original appearance filed with the court, or firmly
and clearly decline involvement.55
The second challenge attorney's face is that courts are not necessarily
bound by the limited scope contract.56 Judges are concerned with the
overall administration of justice. They strive to manage the docket, are
concerned about the interest of all parties involved, and the "public
perception" of the litigation process. 51 Even when an attorney stays
carefully within the scope of a limited representation appearance, the more
extensive the scope and the closer in time the representation continues to
the actual trial, the more likely the court will order continued involvement
after all limited representation contract obligations have been satisfied.
c. Withdrawing From Limited Scope Representation
Because filing an appearance or any pleading in a matter pending
before a tribunal is considered a general appearance-which requires leave
of court to withdraw before the completion of the case'59-jurisdictions that
specifically amended their rules to allow for a limited-scope-representation
appearance were forced to also promulgate or amend existing rules to allow
attorneys to withdraw once the limited tasks or objectives were
accomplished.60 The main reason for seeking limited representation is to
limit the cost of legal assistance to those tasks specifically bargained for;
this process only works in litigation if the courts recognize the contractual
rights of the attorney to withdraw once the attorney's contractual
obligations are satisfied.161 As with other procedural rules regarding limited
representation, the procedural rules concerning withdrawal vary from state-
to-state, and range from requiring no court involvement to requiring actual
judicial oversight.1 62 On one end of the continuum are those states that
155. See Limited Assistance Representation (Unbundling) Training Materials, supra note
152, at 5-6.
156. Sharp v. Sharp, No. 02-74, 2006 WL 3088067, at *10 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 26, 2006)
("[An] attorney's agreement with his client is not binding upon the court where counsel seeks to
represent such client before the court.").
157. See id. at *9.
158. See, e.g., id.
159. Id. at *8-9.
160. See A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SER VS., supra note 64, at
19.
161. See Limited Assistance Representation (Unbundling) Training Materials, supra note
152, at 2.
162. See A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 64, at
19,23-25 (citing NEV. 8TH J. DIST. CT. R. 5.28) (permitting lawyers to "merely appear" on behalf
of a client pursuant to a limited scope agreement and provide notice of the limitation at the
beginning of the hearing); see also UTAH R. CIV. P. 75(b) ("[T]he attorney shall file a Notice of
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adopted a "de facto" approach.6 3 Maine, for example, presumes the
representation has ended once the limited scope tasks have been
accomplished.1 6 Similarly, the Wyoming rule states that "[a]n attorney who
has entered a limited entry of appearance shall be deemed to have
withdrawn when the attorney has fulfilled the duties of the limited entry of
appearance."65 This type of de facto approach expedites the withdrawal
process and best protects the limited scope retainer agreement.66
Other jurisdictions involve minimal court oversight by simply
requiring that the attorney file a "notice of completion" of the limited scope
representation with service to the client and other involved parties.'67 The
withdrawal is then entered without the need for court approval.'68
Some states, however, not only require filing a notice of withdrawal
but also allow time to contest the end of representation. This approach
opens the door to litigation on the issue and increases the chance for
involvement beyond that agreed to between the attorney and client. 69 The
rule regulating withdrawal of limited scope representation in family matters
in California, for example, requires the attorney to serve the client with an
application to be relieved as counsel, stating that the scope of the
representation is complete.o70 The attorney must also serve a blank
objection form along with the application.'7' Even when no objection is
filed and the court issues an- order allowing the withdrawal, the attorney
must serve the client with a court order giving the client another
opportunity to object to the withdrawal. 172 If an objection is made, a hearing
Limited Appearance.... The Notice shall specifically describe the purpose and scope of the
appearance and state that the party remains responsible for all matters not specifically described in
the Notice.").
163. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 64, at 23
(emphasis omitted); e.g., ME. R. Civ. P. 89(a).
164. See ME. R. Civ. P. 89(a).
165. WyO. DIST. CT. UNIF. R. 102(c).
166. See A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 64, at
21.
167. Id. at 23; e.g., FLA. FAM. L.R. PROC. 12.040(c)(1); IOWA R. Civ. P. 1.404(4); WASH.
Civ. R. CT. LTD. J. 70.1(b); WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R, 70. 1(b).
168. A.B.A STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 64, at 23;
see, e.g., FLA. FAM. L.R. PROC. 12.040(c)(1); IOWA R. Cry. P. 1.404(4); WASH. Civ. R. CT, LTD.
J. 70.1(b); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIv. R. 70.1(b).
169. See A.B.A STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 64, at
25; see also ARIZ. R. FAM. L. PROC. 9(B)(2)(b) (providing that if the client does not sign the
notice of withdrawal form, the attorney must file a motion stating that the tasks outlined in the
limited scope notice are completed; furthermore, the other parties have ten days after service to
file an objection to the motion, and if an objection is filed, a hearing may be scheduled).
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is scheduled. ' This approach protects the limited scope representation
agreement he least, but it may best protect the client from the inappropriate
use of unbundled services.74 As a result of the efforts of the ABA and state
courts, a procedural framework for providing limited scope representation
in matters involving litigation exists in almost all state court systems,
IV. ACCOMPLISHING THE GOAL OF PROVIDING INCREASED ACCESS TO
JUSTICE IN FAMILY MATTERS THROUGH COMPETENT LIMITED
REPRESENTATION
The decision to provide limited representation in family matters
requires more than just knowledge of the rules that govern the use of these
services. As explained, the availability of limited representation does not
replace the requirement to provide competent representation.176 Although
the effectiveness of limited representation as a tool for improving access to
justice in domestic-relations cases remains unclear, there are lessons to be
learned from discussing how such services have been viewed in other civil-
litigation areas and what weaknesses or problems have been exposed.
Because providing services that are reasonably necessary to assist a
client achieve reasonable objectives is essential to providing competent
representation, limited representation cannot be used to exclude these
necessary services. If the services excluded are reasonably necessary to
attain the client's objectives, competent representation cannot be provided,
"regardless of how knowledgeable, skilled, thorough, and prepared the
lawyer may be."'77 Likewise, services cannot be excluded in an effort to
limit responsibility for not having the skill and knowledge required to
perform the essential services: "[A] lawyer may not so limit the scope of the
lawyer's representation as to avoid the obligation to provide meaningful
legal advice, nor the responsibility for the consequences of negligent
action." 7 8 Basic competency when providing limited services begins with
the understanding that even if the client is demanding less, to do so may not
173. Id,; see, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 3.36(g); CAL. R. CT. 5.425(e)(4); CAL. R. CT. 5,71 (repealed
2013).
174. See A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 64, at
25 (discussing safeguards available to clients subjected to the inappropriate use of unbundled
services).
175. See generally Court Rules, supra note 144 (providing examples of state-court rules
related to limited scope of representation),
176. Dignity Health v. Seare (In re Seare), 493 B.R. 158, 187-88 (Bankr, D. Nev. 2013).
177. Id. at 189 (citing NEV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2011)); see aLbo MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2013).
178. MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 55, at 93-94 (quoting Colo. Bar Ass'n
Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 101 (1998) (considering unbundled legal services)).
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be in the client's best interest; '79 moreover, it may result in sanctions or
other court-ordered punishment, or rise to the level of malpractice and bar
discipline.'8 0
A. Domestic Relations Is Not an Area to Wander Into
Despite the challenges inherent in handling domestic-relations matters,
a financial incentive to provide some assistance in this area exists.ist
Accompanying the changes in family dynamics and family law was an
increasing demand for representation.182 Because of the growing need for
assistance with family matters, 183 more attorneys are being drawn into the
family law arena.'8 4 General practice attorneys often include domestic
relations as a practice area, believing it can supply a steady source of
clientele and income. "Many attorneys believe that family law is a bread
and butter practice that they can fall back upon when other practice areas
decrease."'85 Although family law litigants may benefit from the
availability of lower fees associated with more competition,'" this benefit
must be balanced against the harm that can be caused by attorneys who
wander into the family courts lacking the skills and knowledge necessary to
practice in today's complex and specialized family law atmosphere.
"[AIttorneys who believe they can 'pick up a divorce or two' underestimate
the skills and knowledge required for effective family law practice, with the
result that family law practice today represents one of the fields of practice
with the highest rates of disciplinary complaints and malpractice
actions."187 This concern is heightened when a client who is already
experiencing financial instability seeks only limited representation in order
to prevent the cost of litigation from further reducing already dwindling
- 188financial resources.
Unbundled legal services can provide an attractive opportunity to
attorneys who lack family law expertise to earn fees without finding
themselves "in over their heads"-that is, doing more than they are
qualified for or more than they agreed to in the contract. Representing a
179. See id,
180. See Part W.A.
181. See Fines, supra note 17, at 405.
182. Id at 403-04.
183. See id at 405 ("Domestic relations and juvenile caseloads together make up sixteen
percent of all non-traffic state court trial cases.")-
184. Id. at 404-05.
185. Id. at 405.
186. See id.
187. Id
188. See Grossman, supra note 8, at 362.
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client behind the scenes without the need to file an appearance, or in some
jurisdictions to even disclose the assistance, may alleviate the concern of
being dragged into litigation.189 The ability to file a limited representation
appearance on a simple issue can be seen as protection against being
dragged into more complicated matters. The limited, yet clear, message
provided by the courts on the use of limited representation for clients
involved in litigation is that the attorney's obligations extend beyond the
ethical and procedural rules and beyond the agreement between the attorney
and the client.'90
B. Lessons to Learn From Outside the Family Law Arena
Although little empirical data are available that assess whether limited
representation is achieving the goal of providing increased access to justice
in the family court,191 a review of how other courts have analyzed the use of
limited representation in other areas involving litigation provides valuable
guidance for those considering the use of limited representation to assist
litigants achieve their legal objectives.92 The three examples discussed next
involve complex legal matters concerning important and sensitive financial
and personal issues. Three themes are consistent: (1) the importance of the
initial consultation in ascertaining the client's goals and appropriateness of
limited representation; (2) the need for the involvement of experienced
attorneys; and (3) the need to discourage attorneys from offering this
alternative form of representation for any reason other than to attain or
further client objectives.
1. A Federal Court Warns: Competence Is the First Domino 19
Although the idea of unbundled legal services in federal cases was
initially met with skepticism, the use of limited representation has been
gaining approval in some federal court proceedings.194 Attorneys who
provide unbundled services by excluding representation in adversarial
proceedings, however, still face a high burden when trying to show
compliance with competency and other rules.'9 A recent bankruptcy court
decision provides a warning for attorneys seeking to stay out of the
189. See infra Part V.A-B.
190. See infra Part V.A-B.
191. See Jennings & Greiner, supra note 46, at 826.
192. See infro Part IV.B.1-3.
193. Dignity Health v. Scare (In re Seare), 493 B.R. 158, 220 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2013).
194. Id. at 183.
195. See id. at 183-85; see also !n re Egwirn, 291 B.R. 559, 580-81 (Bankr N.D. Ga. 2003);
In re Castorena, 270 BR. 504, 529 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001).
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courtroom when contracting to provide limited representation. ' 6 In In re
Seare, the debtors' attorney was sanctioned for violating several ethical
rules and provisions of the Bankruptcy Code by providing a one-size-fits-all
approach to assisting debtors.'7 In addition to issuing sanctions against the
debtors' attorney, the court ordered that the opinion be published with the
goal of deterring other attorneys from inappropriately limiting services in
the future.' "
Using the relevant local competency rule'99 as the foundation, the
court provided an in-depth analysis of errors made to support its
determination that sanctions were appropriate. The court determined that
the attorney excluded representation in adversarial proceedings as a means
to accomplish his own objectives rather than his clients' objectives.20' The
debtors sought legal assistance after having been served with a wage
garnishment issued in connection with a judgment against the husband-
debtor.20 ' The judgment was based on a finding that the husband-debtor had
committed a "fraud upon the court" 2 02 by providing false information in a
discrimination claim against his employer, a health foundation.' The
debtors sought the assistance of the bankruptcy attorney with the primary
goal of permanently stopping the wage garnishment.2 0 At the initial
consultation, the debtors signed a nineteen-page, boilerplate retainer
agreement.205 How the initial consultation was actually conducted and the
level of involvement, if any, of the attorney was a disputed issue, and one
that was central to the court's determination that the attorney had not
provided competent representation from day one.206 At the show-cause
hearing, the attorney admitted that he did not personally review the limited
representation retainer agreement with the clients, and he could not even
provide evidence supporting his one-size-fits-all approach of having a
paralegal review the agreements with the client.207 In fact, the debtors
testified that they were put in a room, alone, to go over and sign the
196. See In re Scare, 493 B.R. at 227-28.
197. Id. at 227.
198. See id at 224-27.
199. NEV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT IL 1.1 (2013); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2013)-
200. In re Scare, 493 B.R. at 223-24.
201. Id. at 171.
202. Id. Note that a judgment based on fraud is generally not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012).
203. In re Seare, 493 B.R. at 171.
204. Id
205. Id. at 172.
206. Id at 179.
207. Id. at 204.
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nineteen-page retainer agreement.208 The boilerplate retainer agreement
recited a flat fee for a Chapter 7 case.20 The fee agreement separated the
basic services covered by the flat fee and those that would require
additional fees.2' Both matters involving allegations of fraud and those
involving adversarial proceedings were listed under services that would
require additional fees.2 1' The agreement also listed fraud as "DEBTS
THAT DO NOT GO AWAY." 212
Although the attorney was provided with some information during the
initial client intake about the lawsuit that resulted in the wage
213
garnishment, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition was filed and the
representation proceeded within the limits of the retainer agreement.2 14
Even after opposing counsel stated at the meeting of creditors that he would
seek to enforce the wage garnishment and announced the intention to
pursue adversarial proceedings, the effect of these events on the limits of
the representation were never reviewed with the clients.21 As promised, an
adversarial complaint was filed shortly before all other debts were
discharged; however, the debtors did not learn that the debt justifying the
wage garnishment survived bankruptcy until after they received notice of
the discharge of all other debts.216 The attorney's response to the debtors
when they questioned the status of the wage garnishment was particularly
troubling to the debtors and the bankruptcy court judge.2 17 The debtors were
not only informed or "reminded" that a debt based on fraud was not
dischargeable, but they also leamed for the first time that the attorney had a
settlement discussion with counsel seeking to enforce the wage garnishment
before the adversarial action was filed."' The attorney then informed the
clients, relying on the executed retainer agreement, that he would not
represent them in the adversarial proceeding.219 As a result, not only was
the debtors' primary objective of permanently stopping the wage





213. Id at 171-72 & n.6. How much information the clients provided to the attorney during
the initial consultation was also disputed- Id.
214. Id. at 173.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id at 173-74.
218, Id
219. Id at 174.
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garnishment not attained, but the clients were also forced to proceed pro se
into an adversarial action in federal bankruptcy court.2 2 0
The judge began the analysis by discussing the importance of
attorneys' fiduciary duties and responsibilities, and that these duties
transcend mere technical compliance with contract provisions and rules:
"Lawyers are not plumbers.... [They] are professionals that owe fiduciary
duties to their individual clients, and must continue to represent them even
if initially rosy predictions turn sour."22 ' The problem in this case, however,
was not just what happened after the limited representation began; the
problem was created at the time of the initial consultation, or even before
the initial consultation, because of the one-size-fits-all approach the
attorney took to each bankruptcy case.
The attorney's "first failure-the root cause of his other failings-was
to not define the goals of the representation" with respect to these specific
clients,223 This failure was the result of a lack of communication with the
clients at the initial intake. The attorney either mistakenly assumed that
the obligation underlying the wage garnishment was a medical bill because
it was owed to a health services organization, or he negligently assumed the
debt was dischargeable and failed to put the clients' objective of eliminating
the garnishment before his desire to collect a fee.225 If the desire for the fee
was placed above the needs of the clients, the attorney violated his fiduciary
duties and did not provide competent representation.2 26 The court reasoned:
"[A]ttorneys are professionals. Individuals place their financial lives, and
more, in their attorney's hands. Attorneys have ethical obligations to their
client regardless of the economic pressures which might exist."227 If the
attorney simply misunderstood the clients' objectives or the facts, the
attorney still violated his ethical obligations because "[i]f the attorney and
the client have different understandings of the goals of representation,
viewed objectively, then the lawyer has not fulfilled the duty of
competence."
Once the lack of competency knocked over the "first domino,"'229 other
ethical violations were almost certain to occur.23 0 Because the retainer
220. Id.
221. Id. at l81-82.
222. Id. at 190, 227.
223. Id. at 190.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 190-91.
226. See id at 227.
227. Id at 182 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Castorena, 270 B.R. 504, 530-31
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2001)).
228. Id. at 190.
229. Id. at 220.
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agreement did not provide for services that would assist the clients in
obtaining their primary goal, providing limited representation was neither
reasonable nor based on informed consent; thus, the limited representation
retainer agreement could not comply with Model Rule 1.2(c).2 ' Viewing
the reasonableness of the services at the time of the retainer agreement,232
the attorney could not have reasonably concluded that the services
contracted for, which excluded an almost inevitable adversarial proceeding,
would be useful in assisting the clients in attaining their objective.33 Due to
the complex legal nature of bankruptcy proceedings, which include issues
governed by both federal and state law and involve "a complicated array of
forms and. . . decisions," the attorney faced a high burden to show that the
limitation was reasonable.234 The attorney could not meet this burden.2 35
Likewise, the attorney was unable show that both requirements for
obtaining valid informed consent were met. 23 First, by failing to adequately
investigate the nature of the debt associated with the wage garnishment (or
worse, simply ignoring it), the attorney could not have communicated the
necessary information to exclude adversarial proceedings from the
representation's scope in a manner consistent with informed consent.237
Because the nature of the clients' problem was of high emotional and
financial importance, the attorney could not simply rely on a boilerplate
agreement o communicate the most relevant and crucial information for the
clients to understand.238 Second, because the attorney could not show that
the clients were adequately informed of the risks associated with excluding
adversarial proceedings, he could not show that the clients understood these
risks.2 39 The boilerplate agreement was again viewed with skepticism:
"[I]nitialing and signing [the attorney's) contract of adhesion . . . did not
sufficiently demonstrate that he [d]ebtors understood the import of
proceeding without representation in adversary proceedings."40 Without
this understanding, any consent given by the clients was not valid.4 In re
Seare thus provides important lessons on what not to do for attorneys
230. See id.
231. Id. at 188-89, see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2013).
232. See supra Part III.B.
233. See In re Scare, 493 B.R. at 191-92; see supra Part TV.B.1.
234. See In re Scare, 493 BR. at 195.
235, Id. at 196.
236. Id. at 203-04.
237. See id. at 203.
238. See id. at 194-95.
239. Id. at 203-04.
240. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
241. Id. at 203.
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practicing in potentially lucrative, yet complicated, areas of the law who are
considering the use of limited representation.
2. Limited Representation Does Not Mean Partial Representation
As seen in In re Seare, limited representation creates an attractive
opportunity for attorneys to capitalize on offering services to those of
limited means during tough economic times.2 4 2 State-court judges are faced
with an increasing number of pro se litigants defending themselves against
creditors in state courts, and their experiences can offer some insight into
the problems associated with litigants receiving some attorney assistance
behind the scenes while proceeding in court on their own. Two trial court
decisions from Rhode Island remind attorneys that limited representation
cannot be used to carry out tasks that could not have been ethically or
legally done when providing full representation, and that judges are not
limited by the ethical rules when assessing attorney misconduct.2 3
"[L]imited representation does not equate to partial representation."244
Rhode Island courts have held that "ghostwriting" as a means of
providing limited representation, violated Rule 11 and ethical rules.2 45
Much has been written about the efficacy of allowing ghostwriting to assist
litigants in state and federal court, but the focus here is on the important
lessons that can be learned from the reasoning in two decisions involving
legal services provided by the same debt settlement company.4
In HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. v. Cournoyer, the court held that even
though the attorney's actions preceded the holding in the second case-that
using limited representation as a justification for ghostwriting was
improper- the attorney should have known that her actions violated clear,
established rules.247 As a result of the judge's colloquy when approving a
settlement agreement between a creditor bank and the debtor who appeared
pro se, the judge discovered the debt settlement company's involvement.
Particularly troubling to the court was the involvement of an attorney who
prepared all of the debtor's pleadings, including an answer with three
defenses, an objection to the motion for summary judgment, and a seven-
242. See supra Part IV.B. I.
243. See HSBC Bank Nev., N.A. v. Cournoyer, C.A. No. PC-1 1-0194, at 3-4 (RI. Super.
Ct. Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SuperiorCourt/DecisionsOrders/decisions/11-
0194.pdf; Card v. Pichette, C.A. No. PC 2011-2911, at 10 (R.I. Super. Ct, July 26, 2012),
http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SuperiorCourtl/DecisionsOrders/decisions/1 1-2911 .pdf.
244. Pichette, at 11.
245. Id at 1; see also R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 11,
246. See Cournoyer, at 3-4; Pichette, at 2.
247. Cournoyer, at 27.
248. Id. at 2-4.
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page memorandum supporting the objection.24 9 All of the pleadings were
signed by the debtor pro se.2 so At the settlement hearing, the debtor
informed the judge that he believed he was represented by counsel even
though he had never met his attorney.25 1 He added that he was surprised
that his attorney was not present in court.252 At a show-cause hearing in
which the attorney was ordered to address whether her actions violated Rule
11 of the Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure,5 the attorney argued that
she was providing limited representation as allowed by Rhode Island
Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct (Rhode Island Rules) Rule
1.2(c), and that she acted in accordance with the "mainstream consensus"
that there is "no obligation to disclose . .. ghostwriting activities."25 4
addition, she argued that she spoke to bar counsel prior to her involvement,
and that "she had expressly got[ten] his blessing ... in order to be able to
assist these people."55 Finally, she argued that even if offering such
services violated the Rhode Island Rules, she should not be sanctioned
because, at the time she provided the services, there was no lanown
prohibition against "ghostwriting."2 56
Relying on the court's equitable powers and inherent authority to
impose sanctions to protect the integrity of the court system against fraud
and deceitful actions, the judge exercised this power to punish the attorney
and to deter future attorney misconduct.5 7 This power was in addition to,
and not subject to, the attorney disciplinary board process. "Whether a
practice is permitted in the abstract by the [Rhode Island Rules],
249. Id. at 2-3.
250. Id. at 2.
251. Id. at 3.
252. Id,
253. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 11. Rule 11 states in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the
signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation. ... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule,
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, any appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
Id.
254. Cournoyer, at 6-7,
255. Id at 4 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
256. Id at 7.
257. Id at 13, 27.
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enforcement of which may fall outside the scope of this [clourt's authority,
has no bearing on whether that practice as applied in an actual litigation
setting violates Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure."2 5 8 Indicating that
limited representation may be a valuable tool in some cases, the court
distinguished the attorney's conduct from that of attorneys using limited
representation to offer pro bono services to assist those in need.259 The
attorney was associated with an industry that managed billions of dollars of
consumer debt for profit. 2 0 The judge noted that debtors are often harmed,
rather than helped, by such services.2 61 The court held that even if
ghostwriting was permitted by the Rhode Island Rules, the court still had
authority to assess the appropriateness of its use under the court's
procedural rules.
The court started its assessment by examining the limited scope
retainer agreement itself and found that the attorney did not specifically
exclude the obligation for the attorney to attend court hearings.2 63 In fact,
the agreement listed attending hearings as a service that may be provided
"at [the] attorney's discretion. "2 Citing the obligation to provide
competent representation even when providing limited representation, the
court found that this provision likely violated both Rhode Island Rule 1.2(c)
and the competency rule because it was unreasonable.2 65 The court reasoned
that it was unlikely that Rhode Island Rule 1.2(c) could be read to condone
a limited representation agreement hat allows the attorney to determine, at
her discretion, whether counsel would attend court hearings.26 6 Such a
reading would not be consistent with the attorney's duty to provide
267competent representation,
The domino effect articulated by the federal bankruptcy court in In re
Seare occurred here as well. 268 Even though the court's inherent power to
sanction attorneys for procedural-rule violations was viewed independent of
the rule of professional conduct-and thus the court need not follow the
258. Id. at 13-14.
259. See id. at 7.
260. Id. at 8.
261. Id. In fact, the debtor in the case discussed here eventually filed for bankruptcy. Id. at
19, 24.
262. Id. at 13.
263. Id. at 15.
264. Id at 14.
265. Id. at 14-15.
266. Id. at 14.
267. Id. at 15.
268. Dignity Health v. Scare (In re Scare), 493 BR. 158, 220 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2013).
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mainstream by allowing ghostwriting-violations of the ethical rules
further supported Rule 11 sanctions.26 9
Once the client's goals were not clearly defined and the services
contracted for were not narrowly tailored to attain those goals, the violation
of other rules was certain to follow.270 Because of the leniency given to pro
se litigants in court proceedings and the unfair advantage these litigants
gain when they submit pleadings prepared by undisclosed counsel,
failing to disclose the attorney's involvement was seen as ef
misrepresentation to the court that was prejudicial to the overall
administration of justice and therefore violated Rhode Island Rule 8.4(c)."'
Further, the failure to disclose substantial assistance was viewed as a
violation of the duty of candor toward the tribunal as required by Rhode
Island Rule 3.3(c).2 7 3 Specifically, the attorney violated Rhode Island Rule
3.3 by failing to disclose her involvement and making a "conscious
misrepresentation" to the court by instructing the client to appear pro se,
thus being dishonest with the court.274 In addition, the significant delay in
addressing the client's debt issues caused by a one-size-fits-all debt
collection practice was seen as a violation of Rhode Island Rule 3.2's duty
to "expedite litigation consistent with the interest of the client."2 75
The court found that even though the ABA endorsed ghostwriting
activities, this was an unsettled area of law in state courts and certainly one
that had not been addressed by Rhode Island state courts at the time the
attorney provided these services to the client and other litigants.276 The
court found, therefore, that the attorney had "fair warning" that offering
these services was inappropriate. The court reasoned that Rule 11 was
not new, and even the ethical rule governing the use of limited
representation did not excuse compliance with all other ethical rules.278
Monetary sanctions were ordered.79
While the attorney in Cournoyer was sanctioned for the use of
ghostwriting as a form of limited representation, even absent a clear
prohibition by the state court or disciplinary board, the holding in the
269. See Cournoyer, at 15.
270. See id. at 14.
271. Id. at 17, This is an issue addressed in several court decisions and other scholarly
articles, but not the focus here.
272. Id. at 20-21; see also R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2013).
273. Cournoyer, at 20; see also R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2013).
274. Cournoyer, at 24.
275. Id. at 19; R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2013).
276. Cournoyer, at 24-25.
277. Id at 25-26.
278. Id at 26-27.
279. Id at 27.
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second case, Card v. Pichette,280 provided clear notice to attorneys within
the state that the failure to disclose substantial assistance given to litigants
who appear pro se violates Rule 11, as well as the ethical rules.281 The
defendant in Pichette was receiving assistance from the same debt
settlement company involved in Cournoyer.28 In Pichette, counsel for the
plaintiff, the creditor, informed the court that despite the fact that the
defendant appeared pro se and signed all pleadings pro se, an attorney
prepared all of the defendant's pleadings.283
Pichette reinforces the lesson that limited representation cannot further
the goal of providing increased access to justice unless the client's needs
and the goals of the representation are clearly identified at the outset.2 84 The
scope of the representation must be carefully tailored to attain the client's
goals, not those of the attorney. In Pichette, at a hearing to determine
whether the attorney providing the assistance violated ethical and
procedural rules, the attorney admitted to preparing the pleadings in this
286case as well as several other cases then pending in state court. The
pleadings filed in all of these cases were "virtually identical." 28 7 The
defendant testified that the only contact between the defendant and the
attorney was a telephone conversation prior to the hearing before the
court. 288 When questioned by the judge, the defendant acknowledged that
he did not understand many of the defenses or claims included in the
pleadings.289 This indicated that not only were the pleadings prepared by
counsel (rather than the defendant), but the defendant was also not involved
in the process or the decision-making regarding how the case would
proceed.290
The court distinguished limited representation from partial
291
representation. While services to clients can be reduced to serve specific,
280. Card v. Pichette, C.A. No. PC 2011-2911 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 26, 2012),
http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SuperiorCourt/DecisionsOrders/decisions/l 1-2911 .pdf, This
decision was issued prior to the decision in Cournoyer, but was not binding on Cournoyer because
the attorney's actions in Cournoyer preceded the Pichette decision. Cournoyer, at 9 n.5.
281. Pichette at I.
282. Id. at 2; Cournoyer, at 3-4.
283. Pichette, at 2. These pleadings included an answer with affirmative defenses and
counterclaims, an objection to a motion to dismiss, and a memorandum of law. Id.
284. See MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 55, at 26.
285. See id. at 57.
286. Pichette, at 3-4. The attorney was unable to state how many other cases he provided
similar services for in the past. Id. at 4.
287. Id. at4.
288. Id. at 6.
289. Id. at 6-7.
290. See id, at 11.
291. Id.
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well-defined needs of a client, services essential to attaining a goal cannot
be carved out of the bundle.292 Because the pleadings and other documents
filed with the court were inextricably woven together with the litigation,
completely divorcing the two resulted in partial representation, not limited
representation. "[Rhode Island] Rule 1.2(c) cannot be interpreted in such a
way as to allow an attorney to provide ... her client with a small piece of
the legal puzzle and then walk away in anonymity."293
The court in Pichette also used the ethical rules to guide its analysis of
whether the attorney's representation violated a procedural rule.294 The
court cited the duty of candor and the prohibition against making false
misrepresentations to the court to justify sanctions.295 Then, taking this
justification one step further, the court indicated that the debt settlement
company was exploiting the ability to use limited representation to gain an
"unfair, tactical advantage" in court proceedings.9 6
The sanctions imposed in Pichette extended beyond Rule 11 sanctions
against the individual attorney and the individual case involved." The
judge referred what appeared to be meritless counterclaims to the state
disciplinary board to determine what, if any, disciplinary action should be
imposed against the attorney and the debt settlement company.298 The
matter was also referred to the state attorney general's office to determine
whether the actions of the debt settlement company and the out-of-state
attorney were illegal. 2 The power of a judge overseeing a case cannot be
underestimated, and a judge's duty to protect the administration of justice
can be a valuable tool in both exposing and punishing the inappropriate use
of limited representation.300
3. A Massachusetts Study Involving Eviction Proceedings Provides
Guidance for Assessing the Appropriate Use ofLimited
Representation
The importance of a careful assessment of whether limited
representation can assist clients in achieving positive outcomes, and the
need for involvement of experienced counsel, is discussed in the findings of
292. See id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 9.
295. Id at 10; see also R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2013); R.I. RULES OF
PROF'S CONDUCT R, 8,4(c) (2013).
296. Id at 16.
297. See id. at 16-17.
298. Id. at 17 n.18.
299. Id. at 18.
300. See id. at 16-17.
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a study conducted in a Massachusetts district court involving litigants
facing a summary eviction proceeding.30 ' In this study, the authors
conducted a randomized trial of carefully selected litigants organized into
two groups. 302 The first group, the control group, received only limited or
"unbundled" assistance. 30 3 Limited assistance was provided to this group
through both informational sessions, such as reviewing the summary
eviction process, and limited litigation assistance, such as help preparing
pleadings or discovery requests. 0 4 The second group, the treated group,
accepted an offer of full representation by a legal services attorney.30 A
comparison of the outcomes for the two groups showed an "extraordinary"
difference in the positive effect of full representation, as opposed to only
limited representation, on at least two tracked outcomes: (1) possession of
the housing unit, and (2) the financial consequences associated with
ligation.306 Almost two-thirds of those who did not have full representation
lost possession of their housing unit, while only approximately one-third of
those with the traditional attorney-client relationship lost possession. 30
Likewise, those who were represented during the entire proceeding realized
more positive financial outcomes, saving on average over nine months'
rent, whereas the control group saved on average less than two months'
rent. 8 Even though this study analyzed the differences in outcomes from
those receiving only limited assistance and those receiving traditional full-
service representation by legal aid providers at no cost, the suggested
findings provide guidance for assessing the appropriateness of offering
limited representation by private attorneys.309 Specifically, the authors
addressed two factors that are essential for the appropriate use of limited
representation in family matters: (1) careful and in-depth screening to
determine representation eeds, and (2) the involvement of experienced and
competent attorneys.310
301. See Greiner et al., supra note 4, at 903.
302. Id.
303, Id.
304. Id. at 917-18.
305, Id. at 908.
306. Id. at 903, 937.
307. Id. at 936.
308. Id. at 936-37.
309. See generally id. at 936-48 (detailing several possible explanations for the results of the
district court's study).
310. See id. at 937-38, 945-46.
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a. Careful Screening to Rule Out the Need for Full Representation
The early face-to-face screening of potential participants to assess the
need for full representation was seen as one potential reason for the higher
incidence of positive outcomes in the treated group.3 1  Each potential
participant in the study was interviewed in person, with some interviews
"lasting an hour or more."3 12 These findings support the need to screen
cases carefully in which the client seeks only limited services. The findings
of the study further suggest important areas of inquiry and assessment in the
initial intake.
Careful screening can identify matters that involve complicated legal
issues, which may indicate the need for full representation.3 14 The authors
identified matters involving complicated legal issues, such as those that
implicate multiple sources of law, "including state statutes, state common
law, state regulations, federal statutes, and federal regulations." 15 A
complex legal issue was viewed as one involving "multiple provisions or
doctrines within each source of law," and the need to introduce evidence
from third parties.316 As discussed above, family law matters often involve
similarly complicated legal issues. 17
Also part of the initial intake was the assessment of a client's ability to
represent herself adequately in court while receiving only limited assistance
outside the courtroom.' The inability to do so indicated the need for full
representation because pro se litigants could not rely on judges in a busy
court system to obtain the information needed "to reach a legally correct
judgment."319 Judges often rely on attorneys to educate them on the relevant
facts and law, further increasing the likelihood of a positive outcome for
litigants represented by counsel.320 As discussed above, family courts, along
with housing courts, are among the courts that have seen a dramatic
increase in filings during these tough financial times.321
311. Id. at 937,
312. Id. at 938. The authors "hypothesized" that the reason that legal representation had such
a small effect on the outcome of a matter in a previous study was partially due "to a service
provider's nonspccific and client-initiated intake system" and the uncertainty of assessing through
a brief telephone conversation whether the outcome of a case could be altered by the offer of full
representation. Id. at 937-38.
313. Id. at 938.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 942.
316. Id.
317. See supra Part IV.A.
318. Greiner et al., supra note 4, at 937.
319. See id, at 942-43.
320. Id at 943.
321. See supra Part IV.A.
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Careful screening should also include an assessment of what factual
information and documentation will be necessary to obtain a positive
outcome.32 2 This study reinforces the importance of carefully assessing all
possible claims and defenses when defining the attorney-client
relationship.323 The legal aid attorneys who provided full representation to
the treated group conducted substantial pretrial factual investigations that
would likely not have been conducted in a short client interview offered
through limited assistance programs.324 These pretrial factual investigations
often unveiled the grounds for claims or defenses against the landlords that
placed the litigants in a much better position to obtain a favorable
outcome.32 5 Basic competence when providing limited representation
requires an investigation into the facts to determine what possible claims or
defenses exist.3 26 It is only when a potential client is informed of the
existence of these possible legal issues that she can give informed consent
to limit representation.327
b. Experience Makes a Difference
The findings of this study indicate that obtaining legal services
provided by attorneys experienced in the applicable field of law will
increase the likelihood of obtaining a favorable outcome.328 The authors list
their sixth possible explanation for the higher incidence of positive
outcomes in the treated group as being the "Model of Service Delivery."32 9
The attorneys who provided full representation in the study were specialists
in poverty law, had up to thirty years' experience in litigating housing
issues, and spent most of their time in courts that dealt with housing
issues.330 To explain the results of the study, the authors hypothesized that
"specialists with long experience in an area of law. . . might produce better
case outcomes for potential clients than nonspecialists or those with less
experience."331 Taking their analysis another step further, the authors
questioned the propriety of private attorneys offering free legal services to
litigants if the attorney providing the services has little or no experience in
322. See Greiner et al., supra note 4, at 944-45.
323. See id. at 945.
324. Id
325. See id For example, a pretrial investigation by the legal aid attorneys found errors in
Section 8 income calculations, possible health department violations, and "cross-metering" or
overcharging for utilities. Id. at 945 & n.136.
326. See MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 55, at 94.
327. See supra Part IIB.
328. See Greiner et al., supra note 4, at 945-46,
329. Id at 945.
330. Id at 946.
331, Id. (footnote omitted).
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the area .33 The authors noted that these well-intentioned attorneys seeking
to provide free assistance in an unfamiliar area of the law may better serve
the goal of providing increased access to justice through donating funds to a
legal aid program or to an attorney who can provide experienced and
competent representation.333 As these authors suggest, increased access to
justice for litigants with family law issues who cannot afford full
representation will not be accomplished by obtaining the limited services of
a well-intentioned family law outsider who sees the opportunity to collect
some fees without being dragged into complicated cases.
V. INCREASING OPTIONS FOR LITIGANTS THROUGH LIMITED
REPRESENTATION WITHOUT SACRIFICING OUTCOMES
The use of unbundled legal services in family law is here to stay.335
Proponents of its use view limited representation as a necessary component
of a family law practice, and its use is predicted to grow in the future.3 36
Simply applying the definition of competency when assessing the
appropriateness of the use of limited representation in family matters can
further the goal of using such services to increase access to justice. If skill is
defined as a trait acquired through training and experience, and judged by
the complexity of the matter involved,337 then a system-wide approach can
be taken to ensure that those receiving limited representation in our family
courts are being assisted by competent counsel, and that the representation
is tailored to attain the client's objectives. This approach begins with a
careful assessment of the current use of limited representation in family
matters involving litigation and efforts to discourage its use when it is not
furthering the goals and objectives of the litigants. At the same time,
experienced family law attorneys should be encouraged to offer these
services when appropriate. Finally, educating those interested in stepping
into the family law arena about the realities of the family law practice and
the appropriate use of limited representation can further the goal of using
such services as a way to increase access to justice in family court.
332. d. at 946-47.
333. Id,
334, See id. at 946-
335. Mosten, supra note 51, at 16.
336. Id at 15-16.
337. See supra Part II.A.
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A. Assessing the Appropriate Use of Limited Representation i Domestic-
Relations Matters
One lesson that can be learned from the examination of how limited
representation has fared in other civil litigation areas is the important role
the trial judge can play in assessing the appropriateness of the limited
services being provided.3 3 ' This assessment should occur both when a
limited appearance form has been filed and when the use of substantial
assistance behind the scene is discovered in court proceedings.33 9 Federal
and state judges have already sent a clear message that when pro se litigants
are receiving substantial assistance from attorneys, the attorneys are not
shielded by Model Rule 1.2(c) or its state counterpart.340 Inexperienced
attorneys and those seeking to use limited representation to further their
own personal gain have, when questioned, been exposed-and
sanctioned.34t The use of sanctions for the inappropriate use of limited
scope representation discourages inexperienced attorneys from offering
services that do not advance client objectives.34 2
Family court judges have frequent contact with litigants. Even when
settlement is reached, a judge must often approve the agreements.343 As
seen with other federal and state cases, the existence of substantial legal
assistance behind the scenes is usually evident.3 44 Once the use of limited
assistance is identified and disclosed through a limited appearance or by
asking questions of the pro se litigants, family law judges can, and should,
use their power to assess whether its use is in accordance with the ethical
and procedural rules and, most importantly, if it is in the overall best
interest of the litigant.4
B. Encouraging Experienced Litigators to Provide Services
If efforts to assess the competency of those providing limited
representation in family matters are successful, there may be a shortage of
experienced litigators available to provide limited services when
appropriate. Deterring inexperienced attorneys from providing these
services may actually provide an incentive for experienced family law
attorneys to fill the gap. Experienced family law attorneys may view the
338. See supra Part TV.B.
339. See supra Part III.B.2.c.
340. See supra Part IV.B.2.
341. See supra Part IV.B.2.
342. See supra Part iV.B.2.
343. See Lemer v. Laufer, 819 A.2d 471, 482-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
344. See supra Part IV.B.
345. See supra Part IV.B.
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efforts to prevent inexperienced attorneys from providing limited
representation as an acknowledgment of the importance of their profession
and the high level of difficulty associated with their practice area.
When experienced and competent lawyers are involved, they should be
allowed to control, along with their client, the scope of the
representation.34 6 Judges, regardless of the delay and frustration pro se
litigants can cause to the docket, must abide by the court rules allowing an
attorney to automatically withdrawal once the limited tasks are complete or
the limited issues are resolved.347
Massachusetts has instituted a program in which family law attorneys
who complete training in the use of limited representation become qualified
and can then enjoy this hands-off approach.340 The attorney becomes
qualified as a Limited Assistance Representation Attorney by completing a
- - 349self-training program for limited scope representation. Once the attorney
is deemed qualified, not only can she file a limited scope appearance but the
attorney can also automatically withdraw once the limited services are
completed by filing a notice of withdrawal of limited appearance.350 If there
is disagreement as to whether the limited representation is complete, the
court "cannot intercede."35' The information materials provided to courts,
attorneys, and clients state that "[i]t is incumbent on an attorney to draft and
execute a clear and unambiguous limited representation agreement. .
which specifically defines when the attorney will appear and withdraw. If
the client and attorney disagree. . . they should resolve the matter pursuant
to the terms of that agreement."3 2 As an added incentive for completing the
training, qualified attorneys are invited to add their name to the list of
Limited Assistance Representation Attorneys maintained by the court and
posted on the court's website.3 " This opportunity provides private attorneys
with the ability to increase income by expanding their client base in their
346. See Jennings & Greiner, supra note 46, at 826-28.
347. See id at 848.




350. Id. at 2.
351. Limited Assistance Representation (LAR) Frequently Asked Questions for Judges,
Court Personnel and Attorneys, BOS. MUN. CT. DEP'T 2, http:f/www.mass.govlcourts/doescourts-
and-j udges/cours/boston-rinuncipal-court/lar-faq-j udges-attorneys.pdf [hereinafter LAR
Frequently Asked Questions] (last visited July 4, 2014).
352. Id.
353. Instructions to Attorneys Completing Self Qualification, COMMONWEALTH MASS. 1,
https://web.archive.org/web/20140617130713/http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/courts-and-
judges/courts/probate-and-family-court/upc/documents/instructionsself-certificationpdf (last
visited July 4, 2014).
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area of expertise.354 The Massachusetts Probate and Family Court Limited
Assistance Representation program provides an example of how to
encourage experienced attorneys to offer limited representation; the training
materials provide an example of how to address those areas of concern
identified by courts in other civil litigation areas.355
C. Limited Scope Representation Training
Attorneys providing limited representation and judges dealing with
litigants receiving only limited assistance should be trained to ensure that its
use is accomplishing the goal of increasing access to justice. The training
materials for the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court Limited
Assistance Representation program seek to accomplish this goal.5 The
self-training materials explicitly state that the ethical obligation to provide
competent representation is not waived when providing limited
assistance.357 Additionally, attorneys are warned not to view limited
representation as a means to gain family law experience, Indeed, the
training materials instruct: "Work within your expertise. . . . Taking a case
for the earning experience is unwise in limited representation. .. It takes
significant expertise in family law to .. give good counsel and avoid
liability." 5
The training materials emphasize the importance of the intake process
in determining whether limited assistance is appropriate.359 The materials
provide a detailed discussion of what should be covered in the initial intake
and include sample intake forms.360 The materials discourage the use of
boilerplate agreements and encourage the use of fee agreements specifically
tailored to the needs of each client.3  In order to further discourage a one-
size-fits-all approach, a list of "Best Practices" warns attorneys not to
provide forms to a client without assisting or reviewing them with the
client. 362
Four sample discussions of intake interviews with possible ending
scenarios are provided to exemplify the issues that may arise during the
354. See id. at 3.
355. See LAR Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 351, at 1.
356. Limited Assistance Representation (Unbundling) Training Materials, supra note 152, at
2.
357. Id, at 3.
358. Id. at 37.
359. Id. at 5.
360. See id. at 7, 50.
361. See id. at 4.
362, Id. at 36, 43-44.
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initial interview."' The sample intake discussions include tips for avoiding
the "unreasonable client" and identifying "litigation lifers," neither of
whom are appropriate recipients of limited assistance.3 " The samples also
present scenarios in which providing limited representation would be
"unreasonable" because the client is unable to handle the balance of the
tasks on her own,65 and when the attorney will not be able to obtain the
client's informed consent because of the client's inability to understand the
risks associated with limited representation.366 By providing incentives for
experienced family law attorneys to be trained and involved in providing
limited representation, those for whom these services are most appropriate
can be provided access to justice.
D. Training for Future Lawyers
Neither the need for legal assistance with family law matters nor the
financial barriers to full representation are likely to recede in the future. In
addition, courts will probably continue to accept the appropriate use of
limited representation and embrace it as a means of accomplishing the
administration of justice. Because of this, law school students should be
exposed to both the appropriate use of limited representation and the
complex and changing nature of family law. 367 Limited representation, its
related ethical and procedural rules, and necessary client management skills
should be included as part of the law school curriculum.36 8 The appropriate
use of limited representation can be explained and explored as a means to
address the system-wide concerns caused by the pro se phenomenon as well
as the system-wide responsibility to increase access to justice to those in
need.369 At the same time, in addition to the traditional family law curricula,
domestic-relations courses should identify family law as an area that
requires an interdisciplinary approach-a broad base of legal knowledge
that extends beyond traditional family law doctrine to interpersonal,
interviewing, and client management skills.370 Just as with mediation and
collaborative lawyering, students interested in practicing in the family law
area should graduate from law school with some exposure to the skills that
363. Id. at 7-15.
364. Id. at 14-15.
365 See id at 15-17.
366 Id. at 29.
367, See J. Herbie DiFonzo & Mary E. O'Connell, The Family Law Education Reform
Project Final Report, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 524, 525 (2006).
368. See id. at 535.
369. See id. at 534-35.
370. See id. at 545.
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are central to offering limited representation.37' By exploring the options for
providing services to those who cannot afford full representation, students
can be encouraged to enter the legal profession with a desire to work toward
providing increased access to justice. Whether through individual efforts by
providing pro bone assistance or limited representation, or through
involvement in the policymaking process, future attorneys should view
increased access to justice to those in need as an attainable reality.
VI. CONCLUSION
Limited scope representation is a valuable tool for providing services
to those who cannot afford full representation but are not eligible for
government assistance because most family law proceedings are civil
cases.37 2 These litigants, however, are entitled to expect the same quality of
representation as those who can afford to contract for full representation.
The use of limited representation will continue to expand in litigation and,
as it does, its successes will be praised, and its failures will be exposed.
Family law is an area in which litigants can be helped through the
appropriate use of limited representation, but it is also an area in which
litigants can be hurt when these services are inappropriate. For this reason, a
system-wide approach is necessary to ensure that these services are only
offered by competent and experienced family law attorneys.
371. Seeid.at525.
372. Cf Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (holding that a constitutional right
to appointed counsel at public expense exists in serious criminal cases), abrogated in part by Scott
v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
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